

Message Text

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EXDIS

FOL USUN 2538 SENT ACTION SECSTATE CAPE TOWN DAR ES SALAAM
GABORONE LAGOS LUSAKA MAPUTO PARIS INFO BONN LIBREVILLE
LONDON OTTAWA PRETORIA JUNE 19, 1978 REPEATED TO YOU QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 02538

EXDIS

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PORG, SF, WA

SUBJECT: CONTACT GROUP MEETING OF JUNE 18

1. THE CONTACT GROUP (MINUS THE FRENCH WHO WERE
UNAVOIDABLY UNAVAILABLE) MET SUNDAY, JUNE 18, TO
CONSIDER NEXT STEPS ON NAMIBIA IN LIGHT OF VIEWS OF
CAPITALS AND EMBASSIES. (WE HAVE NO REASON TO SUSPECT
THAT THE FRENCH WOULD NOT HAVE CONCURRED IN THE DECI-
SIONS REPORTED BELOW.) THE GROUP WAS PERSUADED, ESPE-
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CIALLY BY THE COMMENTS OF AMBASSADORS SPAIN AND EDMOND-
SON, THAT A CONTACT GROUP VISIT TO DAR AND CAPE TOWN
WOULD NOT BE BENEFICIAL AT THE PRESENT TIME AND THAT
LOW-PROFILE, INFORMAL APPROACHES BY RESIDENT AMBASSADORS
IN THOSE TWO CAPITALS WOULD BE MORE PROMISING.

2. WE CONSIDERED THE ORDER IN WHICH SUCH APPROACHES
MIGHT BE MADE. SHOULD THE APPROACH TO NYERERE BE MADE
BEFORE THE ONE TO BOTHA OR VICE VERSA? (THE GROUP
DISCARDED THE NOTION OF SIMULTANEOUS APPROACHES AS

OFFERING NO PARTICULAR ADVANTAGE AS WELL AS POTENTIAL COMPLICATIONS.) THE GROUP'S THINKING WAS AS FOLLOWS:

- (A) IF WE WERE TO APPROACH BOTHA FIRST:
WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO INFORM NYERERE SUBSEQUENTLY THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE NOT WILLING TO ACCEPT A CHANGE IN LOCATION; THAT THEY DID, HOWEVER, AGREE TO LOCATE THE RESIDUAL FORCE SOLELY AT GROOTFONTEIN; AND THAT WE BELIEVE THIS TO BE A SIGNIFICANT CONCESSION. THE FIVE COULD THEN EXPRESS OUR HOPE THAT THE FRONTLINE WOULD FIND THIS TO BE AN ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE. THE OBVIOUS DISADVANTAGE TO THIS SCENARIO IS THE DANGER THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WILL AGREE TO LOCATE THE RESIDUAL FORCE SOLELY AT GROOTFONTEIN AND THAT NYERERE WILL FIND THE CONCESSION UNACCEPTABLE. THEN WE WOULD BE BACK WHERE WE STARTED FROM, HAVING IN THE MEANTIME STRENGTHENED SOUTH AFRICA'S EFFORT TO PROJECT AN IMAGE OF "REASON-ABleness". (THE GROUP BELIEVES IT UNLIKELY THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD REJECT ELIMINATING OSHIVELLO ALTHOUGH THEY MIGHT WELL MAKE THE CONCESSION ONLY ON THE ASSURANCE THAT IT IS THE FINAL CONCESSION THEY WILL BE ASKED TO MAKE.)

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- (B) IF THE APPROACH TO NYERERE IS MADE FIRST: WE WOULD HAVE THE BENEFIT OF HIS VIEWS BEFORE APPROACHING THE SOUTH AFRICANS; HOWEVER, WE WOULD HAVE NO CERTAINTY THAT THE SUGGESTION OF LOCATING THE RESIDUAL FORCE SOLELY AT GROOTFONTEIN WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO SOUTH AFRICA. IN ADDITION, NYERERE COULD HARDLY GIVE HIS SUPPORT TO THAT SUGGESTION WITHOUT VIOLATING HIS POSITION AS SPOKESMAN OF THE FRONTLINE.

3. IN THE END THE GROUP RECOMMENDED APPRAOCHING THE SOUTH AFRICANS FIRST, BUT EVERY MEMBER HAD MIXED FEELINGS. WE, THEREFORE, AGREED TO SEEK THE ADVICE OF CAPITALS AND FRONTLINE EMBASSIES (PLUS LAGOS) BEFORE DISCUSSING THE QUESTION FURTHER. IN ORDER TO FACILITATE CONSIDERATION OF THIS QUESTION, THE GROUP HAS AGREED ON DRAFT TEXTS OF TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH BOTHA AND NYERERE. EACH DRAFT HAS BEEN WRITTEN AS THOUGH IT WILL BE USED ON THE FIRST APPROACH. WHICHEVER DRAFT IS NOT USED FIRST WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE TO BE REVISED TO REFLECT THE OUTCOME OF THE EARLIER APPROACH.

4. IN THE DRAFT TALKING POINTS FOR NYERERE WHICH FOLLOW (THE TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH BOTHA ARE CONTAINED SEPTel), THE GROUP CONSIDERED INCLUDING THE FACT THAT OUR INFORMATION INDICATES THAT THERE ARE NO LOCATIONS BETWEEN WINDHOEK AND KARASBURG WHICH COULD SUPPORT

1500 SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS. WE DECIDED AGAINST THIS INCLUSION, HOWEVER, FOR FEAR THAT IT WOULD BEG THE QUESTION OF LOCATIONS BETWEEN GROOTFONTEIN AND WINDHOEK. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THERE ARE POSSIBLY THREE CITIES IN THE LATTER AREA WHICH COULD SUPPORT THE FIFTEEN HUNDRED; HOWEVER, A SUGGESTION THAT THE TROOPS BE MOVED SIMPLY SOUTH OF GROOTFONTEIN OBVIOUSLY POSES THE SAME DIFFICULTIES FOR OUR PROPOSAL.

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5. AN ADDITIONAL NOTE ON THE TALKING POINTS FOR NYERERE: THIS CONCERNS THE FINAL SENTENCE OF THE PENULTIMATE PARAGRAPH WHICH READS: "WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS MILITARY FORCE HAS BEEN INCREASED BY THE CASSINGA RAID AND THAT THE SIZE OF THE FORCE WILL HAVE TO BE INCREASED ACCORDINGLY." THIS SENTENCE IS DESIGNED TO CONVEY TO NYERERE THAT THE FIVE ARE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL THAT HE MAKE THE UN FORCE EVEN LARGER IN LIGHT OF THE CONCERN ABOUT THE LOCATION OF THE RESIDUAL FORCE AT GROOTFONTEIN.

6. FOR CAPE TOWN, DAR, AND PARIS:
IN LIGHT OF FRENCH ABSENCE FROM THIS MEETING OF THE CONTACT GROUP, REQUEST YOU INFORM THE FRENCH OF THE ABOVE AND PASS THEM COPIES OF THE DRAFT TALKING POINTS FOR NYERERE AND BOTHA.

7. FOLLOWING ARE THE DRAFT TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH NYERERE: BEGIN TALKING POINTS.
OUR FIVE GOVERNMENTS HAVE REVIEWED THE POSITION IN THE LIGHT OF OUR AMBASSADORS' REPORT OF THEIR LAST MEETING WITH YOU. WE FEEL THAT, THANKS TO THE EFFORTS OF THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS IN LUANDA, WE ARE NOW VERY CLOSE TO A SETTLEMENT. OF THE TWO OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS, WE TRUST THAT WALVIS BAY CAN BE DEALT WITH OUTSIDE THE TEXT OF THE PROPOSALS THEMSELVES BY MEANS OF "A POSITIVE AND SUPPORTIVE STATEMENT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS WILL MAKE A FIRM COMMITMENT THAT WALVIS BAY SHOULD BE PART OF NAMIBIA" (FROM PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S MESSAGE). SOUTH AFRICA WILL NOT LIKE THIS, BUT AS THE TEXT OF THE PROPOSALS WILL NOT BE AFFECTED, IT SHOULD NOT AFFECT THEIR PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE
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OF THE PROPOSALS.

ON THE SECOND POINT, HOWEVER, WE SEE VERY REAL DIFFICULTY IN PERSUADING SOUTH AFRICA TO ACCEPT THE CHANGE NOW

PROPOSED, NAMELY THE LOCATION OF THE RESIDUAL SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS AT SOME POINT SOUTH OF WINDHOEK. WE HAVE ALREADY INFORMED YOU OF THE ADVERSE SOUTH AFRICAN REACTION WHEN THIS QUESTION WAS RAISED WITH THEM LAST WEEK. IT WOULD INVOLVE A MAJOR CHANGE IN THE TERMS OF OUR PROPOSALS WHICH THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE ALREADY ACCEPTED. IN ANNOUNCING THEIR ACCEPTANCE THE SOUTH AFRICANS STATED PUBLICLY THAT THEY WOULD NOT MAKE ANY FURTHER CONCESSIONS. THE CHANGE NOW PROPOSED WOULD THEREFORE PRESENT THEM WITH MAJOR POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DIFFICULTY. THE SOUTH AFRICANS WILL NOT FEEL ABLE TO MAKE WHAT WOULD BE PRESENTED BY RIGHT WING OPPONENTS OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AS A MAJOR AND HUMILIATING CONCESSION.

ON THE OTHER HAND, SWAPO, ANGOLA AND ZAMBIA ALSO HAVE IMPORTANT POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS FOR SEEKING TO CHANGE THE LOCATION OF THE RESIDUAL FORCE. THESE HAVE BEEN REINFORCED BY THE CASSINGA RAIDS.

WE ARE ALL AGREED THAT THE ESSENTIAL POINT IS, IN THE WORDS OF THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS AFTER THE LUANDA MEETING, "THAT THE RESIDUAL SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES IN NAMIBIA SHOULD BE PLACED IN CONDITIONS WHICH PREVENT THEM FROM BEING USED AS A MEANS OF INTIMIDATION AND REPRESSION AGAINST THE NAMIBIAN PEOPLE AND FOR AGGRESSION AGAINST NEIGHBOURING STATES". WE BELIEVE THAT OUR PROPOSALS, BY DRASTICALLY REDUCING THE SIZE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES AND CONFINING THEM TO TWO BASES WHERE THEY COULD BE CLOSELY MONITORED BY UN FORCES IN EFFECT PROVIDES SUCH CONDITIONS. IF ALL THE OTHER TERMS OF OUR PROPOSALS ARE ACCEPTED, THE PRECISE CONFIDENTIAL

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LOCATION OF THE RESIDUAL TROOPS IS NOT IN FACT OF GREAT PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE.

WE HAVE CONSEQUENTLY BEEN CONSIDERING WHAT WE CAN OFFER IN THE WAY OF ADDITIONAL ASSURANCES TO SWAPO WHICH CAN ALSO BE PRESENTED TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS AS BEING WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EXISTING PROPOSALS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ONLY POSSIBILITY IS TO NARROW DOWN FURTHER THE EXISTING TEXT OF OUR PROPOSALS WHICH PROVIDES THAT THE RESIDUAL SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS SHOULD BE LOCATED AT OSHIVELLO OR GROOTFONTEIN OR BOTH. WE UNDERSTAND IT IS THE PRESENT INTENTION OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO STATION RESIDUAL TROOPS AT BOTH OF THESE BASES. OUR PROPOSAL WOULD BE TO PERSUADE THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO GIVE UP THE USE OF OSHIVELLO AND CONCENTRATE ALL THEIR TROOPS AT ONE BASE IN GROOTFONTEIN. THIS WOULD IN FACT BE A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE DIRECTION THAT SWAPO WISH SINCE GROOTFONTEIN IS TO THE SOUTH OF OSHIVELLO AND OUTSIDE

OVAMBOLAND. ALSO GROOTFONTEIN IS PURELY A MILITARY BASE WELL REMOVED FROM THE MAIN CENTRES OF POPULATION IN NAMIBIA. THE CONCENTRATION OF THE TROOPS IN ONE BASE WOULD MAKE IT THAT MUCH EASIER FOR THE UN TO MONITOR THEIR ACTIVITIES. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, ENSURE THAT THE UN MONITORING PROCEDURE WAS SUFFICIENTLY CLOSE AND DETAILED TO RULE OUT ANY POSSIBILITY OF THE SMALL RESIDUAL FORCE BEING USED FOR AGGRESSIVE PRUPOSES. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS MILITARY FORCE HAS BEEN INCREASED BY THE CASSINGA RAID AND THAT THE SIZE OF THE FORCE WILL HAVE TO BE INCREASED ACCORDINGLY.

WE ARE CLOSE TO A SETTLEMENT, AND WE BELIEVE THAT WHAT WE ARE PROPOSING ON THE LOCATION OF TROOPS IS THE ONLY CONFIDENTIAL

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FEASIBLE WAY OF BRIDGING THE GAP REMAINING BETWEEN THE PARTIES. BEFORE GOING FURTHER WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS. LEONARD UNQUOTE VANCE

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